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"Retroactivity": What Can We Learn from the Odd
Case of Michael Skakel?

LEWIS KURLANTZICK °

A case like that of Michael Skakel, in which a long time has elapsed
between the time of the alleged offense and the time of legal proceedings,'
poses significant challenges for a legal system. Those challenges are not
completely unexpected, as law operates in the flow of time, and a controversy may embrace a set of events and occasions for official decision occurring at many different points in the flow. The fact-finding process, of
course, faces serious evidentiary difficulties; witnesses frequently have
died, memories of others have faded, documents have disappeared. In addition, in the interim changes will have occurred in a variety of relevant
bodies of law, including the statute of limitations, the rules of evidence,
sentencing guidelines, and other directives governing the conduct of pretrial, trial, and post-trial processes. Accordingly, decisions about what law
to apply-the law in place at the time of the crime or the present lawmust be made. The courts of Connecticut were faced with a number of
these decisions in the course of the prosecution of Skakel.2 One of these
decisions involved the question of whether Skakel could take an immediate
appeal from the order transferring his case from a juvenile to an adult
venue? The answer to that question was provided by the Connecticut Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion in In re Michael S.
The question at issue was whether the transfer order, the ruling transferring the defendant's case from the juvenile to adult docket, was a "final
Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A. Wesleyan University 1965,
LL.B. Harvard Law School 1968. 1 wish to thank Tim Everett, Howard Sacks, Robert Scheinblum,
Colin Tait, and Stephen Utz for their suggestions and to express gratitude to Jeffrey Fritz for valuable

research assistance. I also wish to thank Nell Newton for research support.
ISee infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (outlining the history of the Skakel case).
2 See, e.g., State v. Skakel, No. FSTCR-00135792T, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3548, at "1-2

(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 1I, 2001) (deciding a statute of limitations issue); discussion infra Part L.A
(discussing acase deciding a"retroactivity" issue).
3In re Michael S.,
258 Conn. 621,622, 784 A.2d 317, 318 (2001).
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judgment" and therefore immediately appealable
Stripped to its essentials, from the court's perspective the disposition turned on whether the law
of appeals as amended in 1986 or the appellate rules in place at the time of
the alleged crime governed.' The 1986 amendment treated a transfer order
as a final judgment and authorized immediate appeal.6 The court concluded that the 1986 legislation is not to be applied "retroactively," the
1975 framework applies, and therefore an immediate appeal is not permitted.
The court's decision in In re Michael S. is striking both for its summary character and its unconvincing reasoning. It glibly treats the issue
presented-whether an immediate appeal was available-as if the answer
were obvious. More fundamentally, it bespeaks an approach that addresses
none of the considerations that properly bear on thoughtful resolution of a
choice of law issue, such as the extent of justifiable reliance, the legitimacy
of a claim of unfair surprise by a party, the purpose of the legislative
change and how it is best effectuated, concerns of administrative feasibility, and the difference between the impact of a legal change on primary
behavior and on remedial arrangements.'
The cramped opinion is, in part, understandable in light of the manner
in which the issue was framed and the court's precedents on the issue of
"retroactivity." Those prior decisions established the conceptual framework within which the court operated.9 But these precedents reveal a resort
to categories of judgment which do not track well the values at stake in the
cases and restrict the range of approaches to the problem. This lack of
analytical fit is accompanied by a tendency to paint with too broad a brush
when faced with the kind of challenge offered by the Skakel factual situation. Moreover, the court fails to explain why it is appropriate to look to
legal directives enacted in a subsequent year to define the law in existence
in a prior year. These defects will be illustrated by analysis of a hypothetical variant of the Skakel case along with the case itself. The recommended
approach will then be applied to the resolution of a related case, In re
4

1dat 318.

5 Id. at 318-20, 322. The present law, the product of a 1994 amendment, clearly provides that an
immediate appeal cannot be taken. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127 (2003) (avoiding addressing
appeals, and the historical notes for 1994 say that the legislature deleted the "final judgment" provision). Thus, the legislature's intent to remove the right to immediate appeal is clear. The 1994 change
reversed the position established by the 1986 legislation that a transfer order was to be regarded as a
final judgment for purposes of appeal. Id. Application of the present law was an analytically plausible
option in the Skakel situation but was not considered. See infra note 22 and text accompanying notes

99-137.
6 Public Act No. 86-185 § I(a), 1986 Conn. Acts 360-61 (Reg. Sess.) (repealed 1994).
7 Michael S., 784 A.2d at 322-23.
s See id. at 321-23. In the discussion section of the opinion, the court does not address these considerations.
9 Id. at 322-323.
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And that analysis, hopefully, will offer aid in the treatment of
similar issues in the future.
Though Michael S. on first glance appears to be simply an aberrant
criminal procedure case, in fact it has much to teach us about legal change,
civil and criminal, and the determination of the temporal scope of legislation and judicial decisions.
I. A HYPOTHETICAL
Michael Skakel was accused of the October 1975 killing of fifteenyear-old neighbor, Martha Moxley." At the time of the killing Skakel was
himself fifteen years old. 2 Because of his age at the time of the charged
offense, the matter was initially assigned to the superior court for juvenile
matters. 3 The State quickly moved to transfer the case to the adult Criminal Division of the superior court.' 4 After a set of hearings and the preparation of a report by a Juvenile Probation Services supervisor, the court
granted the State's motion to transfer.' 5
Skakel filed an appeal, which the State moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as premature. 6 The State contended that an immediate appeal of
the transfer order was not available and that the question of error could
only be raised at the conclusion of the prosecution in the adult division if
1o

237 Conn. 364, 678 A.2d 462 (1996).

1 Michael S., 784 A.2d at 318. Technically, he was charged, in January 2000, with delinquency
in that he was alleged to have committed murder. Id.
12 Id. Skakel was thirty-nine years old at the time of his arrest. Id.
13 Id. In Connecticut, the superior court for juvenile matters has exclusive original jurisdiction
over juveniles accused of delinquent acts. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (2003). A delinquent is a
person who, prior to his sixteenth birthday, has violated or attempted to violate any federal or state law,
order of the superior court, or local or municipal ordinance. Id. § 46b-120(l), (6). Although the same
criminal statutes apply to both adults and juveniles, in most cases juveniles are subject to different
procedures and sanctions than adults. See, e.g., id. § 46b-122 (requiring confidential proceedings;
exclusion of persons from hearing); id. § 46b-124(b) (requiring anonymity; confidentiality of records of
juvenile matters); State v. Torres, 206 Conn. 346, 358, 538 A.2d 185, 191 (1988) (discussing statutory
safeguards protecting juveniles). The exception to this proposition involves the transfer of juveniles to
the adult criminal court. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-l 27 (2003).
14 Michael S., 784 A.2d at 318.
Is See In re Michael S., No. DLOO-01028, slip op. at 1-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 31,2001).
Judge
Dennis concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that Skakel committed the homicide, that
there was no state institution designed for the care of children to which the court could commit Skakel
that would be suitable for his care and treatment should he be found delinquent, that the facilities of the
adult criminal division provided a more effective setting for the disposition of the case, and that the
institutions to which that division may sentence a defendant were more suitable for the care and treatment of Skakel should he be found guilty. Id. at 2, 6-7. In ruling on the transfer motion, Judge Dennis
applied the standards contained in the transfer statute in effect at the time of the offense. Id. at i.
Apparently, neither party objected to this application. Had the court applied the standards contained in
the present transfer statute, there is no reason to think a different result would have been reached.
Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17-60a (1975), with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-I 27 (2003).
16 Michael S., 784 A.2d at 319.

CONNECTICUTLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:511

convicted. 7

Skakel was
Accordingly, the parties briefed and addressed
two issues before the supreme court: first, whether Skakel had an immediate right to appeal the juvenile court's decision transferring his prosecution
to the adult division of the superior court, 8 and second, whether the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to the adult division."
To sharpen the analysis I want to hypothesize a variation on the Skakel
situation. Let us assume the court's set of choices was limited to two: 20 1)
the law in existence in 1975, as interpreted by pre-1986 judicial decisions, " applied; or 2) the appeal statute as amended in 1986 applied. 2
Though the parties understandably assumed that application of the
1994 law, eliminating defendants' right to interlocutory appellate review of
transfer orders, was foreclosed in light of the supreme court's decision in

In re Daniel H.,23 the analysis presented in this essay will suggest that such
a result is not at all obviously correct.24 The foreclosure rests on the view
that 1975 law should apply without recognition that which law should apply is not an all-or-nothing issue but rather the appropriateness of application of 1975 or present law depends on the particular matter involved. The
17

See id. The appellate court denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice. Id. The State and

Skakel then jointly requested the case be transferred to the supreme court, a request which that court
granted. Id.
18 Brief of the Respondent-Appellant at i, In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 784 A.2d 317 (2001)
(No. SC 16556).
19 Id Because of the court's holding that an immediate appeal could not be prosecuted, it
did not
have to consider the answer to this second question. In fact, Skakel was convicted, after a jury trial, in
June 2002. David M. Herszenhom, Once Skakel Jurors Could Speak Path to Conviction Seemed
Clear, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, at B I. As a result, the issue of the propriety of the transfer ruling
has now been presented to the Connecticut Supreme Court in the course of Skakel's appeal of his
conviction. See Brief for Appellant at 63-67, State v. Skakel (Conn. filed Nov. 24, 2003) (No. S.C.
16844) (arguing that juvenile court erred in transferring case to adult criminal division of Superior
Court).
20 The court apparently saw itself as facing a choice between these two options. However,
the
option of the 1986 amendment was being considered in a uniquely qualified way. That is, while the
opinion is not as clear as it could have been on this point, implicitly the court had resolved the question
of applicable law with a decision that 1975 law applied and the 1986 amendment, or at least one proposed interpretation of that amendment, was being looked to as a possible illuminator of the 1975 law.
2t In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303, 304-06,488 A.2d 778, 779-80 (1985).
22 A third alternative was application of the present law. See supra note 5. Contemporary appellate rules do not permit an immediate appeal of a transfer order. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127
(2003). These rules reflect the 1994 amendment which eliminated the defendant's right to interlocutory
appellate review of the order transferring him to the regular criminal docket. 1994 Conn. Pub. Acts 942, § 6 (Spec. Sess.).
23 237 Conn. 364, 366-68, 678 A.2d 462, 463-64 (1996) (holding that 1994 legislative decision to
prohibit juvenile from taking interlocutory appeal from transfer order does not apply to juveniles
charged with crimes that occurred prior to October 1, 1994).
24 See discussion infra Part Ill.
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shift in the legal framework I wish to introduce is to posit that no legislative change occurred in 1994.25 In other words, in this scenario the rule
permitting immediate appeal was introduced in 1986 and remains the law

today.
Which choice should a court make-the law in existence in 1975 or the
present law, put in place in 1986? More particularly, how should a court
go about thinking about that choice?
A. Retroactivity
One approach to the choice is to think in terms of retroactivity. That
is, was the 1986 amendment meant to apply to litigation the operative facts
of which arose prior to 1986? The court in the Skakel case itself focused
on the notion of retroactivity. But central dependence on this concept is
unhelpful in reaching a conclusion as to the proper choice.
"Retroactivity" is itself an ambiguous term, one which may as likely
confuse as enlighten. One sense of "retroactivity" refers to the application
of a change in the law to proceedings which occurred prior to the change.
A prime example is the reforms in constitutional criminal procedure announced in the 1960s by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, when the
Court decided in Gideon v. Wainwright that the Constitution requires that
indigent defendants facing imprisonment be supplied with a lawyer at no
cost,26 that decision was then applied to prior cases, past concluded cases,

which, as a result, were reopened.27 Though the Court struggled with the
issue of which of its criminal procedure decisions should be applied retroactively and which should not,28 the term "retroactive" was being used to
refer to concluded cases; and in that sense use of the 1986 appeal rule in
Skakel's case obviously presents no question of retroactivity at all. 29 Indeed, the Supreme Court's concern about the impact on the administration
of justice of retroactive application of a new rule3" has no bearing in our
25 In fact, in 1994 the legislature eliminated the right to an immediate appeal from a court order
transferring a juvenile matter to the regular criminal docket. See supra note 5.
26 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).
27 See Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2, 2-3 (1963).
28 See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297-98 (1967) (holding that the key to the question
of retroactive application is the denial of a fair trial, where the integrity of the truth-determining process
is seriously infected, and there is a need for correction of serious flaws in fact-finding process).
29 Thus, in that sense, it is obvious that the rule of immediate appeal is not being applied "retroactively," in that it only applies to judicial proceedings which take place after its enactment. Similarly,
when the Federal Rules of Evidence are amended, the operating assumption is that the changes generally will apply to court proceedings taking place after the amendments' effective date, even though the
operative facts of those disputes occurred prior to the amendments' effective date and even though the
amendments made changes in some evidentiary rules. If that assumption is defensible, the application
of the amended Rules is no more "retroactive" or questionable than would be the application of the
1986 agpeal rule in our hypothetical Skakel case. See infra note 137.
3°See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (stating that the administration ofjustice will be taxed; disruptive hearings will be required regarding the admissibility of evidence long
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Skakel hypothetical, where use of the 1986 appellate rule would not produce the kind of disruption of processing of current criminal calendars that
troubled the Court. And conceptually, employment of the 1986 rule would
appear to be no different than use of a changed pleading rule in a proceeding which commenced after the change, though the facts of the dispute
predated the change in pleading.3'
This quick look at United States Supreme Court history suggests three
propositions. First, the Court uses the terminology of "retroactivity" differently than the Connecticut Supreme Court uses it in Michael S.32 Second, there was never any doubt in the Court's jurisprudence that a new rule
would be applied to proceedings commenced after its announcement.
Third, if constitutional values were sufficiently strong, the rule would be
applied retroactively, even though that might entail significant administrative cost. 3
' suggests
The ambiguity and differential use of the term "retroactive" 34
that analysis of the central issues in our case might well be aided by avoiding use of the term entirely and by proceeding directly to the relevant considerations. 3' The question would then become, simply: should the 1986
rule about final judgment and immediate appeal be applied, or should the
appeal rule in place at the time of the alleged crime be applied, and what is
the appropriate
reasoning process by which the answer to that question is to
36
reached?
be
destroyed, misplaced, or deteriorated, and, if such evidence is excluded, the witnesses available at the
original trial will be unavailable, or their memories dimmed).
31Similarly, should a declaratory judgment remedy, which did not previously exist, be
confined
to cases whose facts arose after the enactment of the declaratory judgment statute and not be applied to
all proceedings commenced after the statute's passage?
32 1 do not mean to suggest that the Connecticut Supreme Court is unfamiliar with this use of the
terminology of "retroactivity." Its awareness of and participation in that usage is evident in State v.
Brown, 160 Conn. 346, 279 A.2d 554 (1971).
33 As noted, none of those administrative costs are exacted by application of the 1986 appellate
rule in Skakel. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. And its use would involve application to a
proceeding commenced well after its enactment.
34 See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
35Of course, though we rarely think about it, the standard common law contract or tort
action involves retroactivity in the sense that the court's decision not only announces a precedent for the future
but resolves a dispute the operative facts of which are in the past; in other words, these decisions govern claims arising from facts antedating the judicial action. See generally LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY
OF THE LAW 99-102 (1968) (discussing the retrospective operation of common law decisions). Not
surprisingly, then, new judge-made rules and statutory changes both generate similar concerns about
fairness and efficiency.
36 Use of the terminology of retroactivity may befoul the analysis in another way. That usage
may be understood as more than descriptive; in other words, it may not be experienced as simply stating the choice of law question but as biasing the answer to that question as well due to the legal system's general resistance to retroactive application of (at least) legislative pronouncements. See, e.g.,
COr. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-1(t), (u), 55-3 (2003) (restricting the retrospective effects of the passage or
repeal of acts, as well as those of any new provisions imposing any new obligations on any person or
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In my comments on retroactivity I do not mean to suggest that legislative communication about application is irrelevant. Should the legislature
indicate that the enacted change is to be applied only in litigation involving
operative facts arising after the enactment, there is no reason for a court not
to follow that directive. But in the absence of such a statement-and such
a legislative statement is a rare occurrence-a court should look to the considerations explored in this essay. At a minimum, analysis of the nature
and consequences of legal change, and determination of the temporal limits
of judicial and legislative lawmaking, will be furthered by understanding
the concept of retroactivity as a spectrum or range of temporal options
rather than a binary construct.37
A variation of this point issues from examination of the court's observation, in a recent case, that application of a criminal law is retroactive if it
changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective
date.3" The problem is that any change-whether in the rules of pleading,
evidence, or sentencing-literally alters the effects incident to previous
activity. Thus, to be of utility the proposition must refer to consequences
in a narrower sense. But then the question becomes: what consequences
count and why?
B. Substance versus Procedure
Another analytical approach to the choice is to think in terms of the
categories of substance and procedure. This approach, which is employed
in the Michael S.opinion, would make the answer depend on whether the
later rule is characterized as substantive or procedural. If the latter, it
would be applied; if the former, it would not. But recourse to the language
of "substance" and "procedure" for resolution of the central issue is no
more illuminating than reference to retroactivity.39
In the Michael S. opinion the court simply declares, in a single sentence, that the 1986 change is a substantive rather than a procedural one,
and therefore it is not to be applied. ' No reasons are offered in defense of
corporation); see also Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, 110
HARV. L. REv. 1055, 1072 n.109 (1997) (warning that efforts to formulate a precise definition of retroactivity may be misguided). Yet no presumption is warranted in the absence of consideration of the
character of the legislation (or judicial decision).
37 See Fisch, supra note 36, at 1069-72, 1087 n.191 (discussing the problems associated with the
binary retroactivity construct, and with treating retroactivity in terms of bright-line categories).
38 State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 702, 817 A.2d 76, 87 (2003) (citing Weaver v. Graham, 450
U.S. 24,31 (1981)).

39 See Michele A. Estrin, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to Pending
Cases, 90 MIcH. L. REv. 2035, 2061-62 (1992) (arguing that the substance-procedure distinction lacks
content, and blurs the appropriate analysis to distinguish between objectionable and acceptable effects
of retroactivity).
40 In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621,630, 784 A.2d 317, 323 (2001).
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declaration. 4'

this
Rather, in support of the conclusion the opinion cites In
re Daniel H.4 2 and In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01. 43 But those opinions
also provide no analysis and themselves simply state the position that introduction of a right to appeal constitutes a substantive legal change."
Moreover, the principle of lenity dominates the court's opinion and
conclusion in In re Daniel H.45 In short, the court has failed to respond
adequately to two interrelated tasks: first, to explain why the issue of application of a change in the law should turn on whether that change is
substantive or procedural; and second, to define the characteristics of a
substantive as compared with a procedural change.
Admittedly, the substance-procedure distinction is an elusive one.'
And the answer given may differ depending on the purpose for which the
question is asked. 47 However, not only is the court's position in Michael S.
not obviously correct, but it is counterintuitive, running counter to the conventional understanding of the categories. Put roughly, substantive rules
control conduct outside the courtroom, and procedural rules control behav41 The court's reference to the substance-procedure dichotomy is intertwined
with its retroactivity

discourse, for, it states, a statute which alters substantive rights ordinarily is not subject to retroactive
application. See id.
42237 Conn. 364,678 A.2d 462 (1996).
43221 Conn. 625, 605 A.2d 545 (1992).
44Id. at 549. Not only does In re Judicial Inquiry No. 85-01 provide no analysis
of the substantive-procedural characterization question, its particular circumstances offer limited support, at best, for
the general proposition that a change in appellate rules is a substantive alteration. The petitioners in
that case sought appellate review of a grand jury panel's denial of their request for the release of evidence. Id. at 546. The supreme court held that the statute in effect at the time when the grand jury filed
its report, which contained no right of appeal, governed the case and dismissed the petition. Id. The
decision, though, offers insubstantial support for the general proposition because 1) the statute establishing a right of appeal itself said that it applied only to grand jury findings filed after its effective date
and 2) the appeal provision could be seen as part of an integrated, comprehensive revision of the investigatory grand jury system, i.e., a package not to be implemented piecemeal.
45 See infra notes 119-25 and accompanying
text.
46 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 392 (1989) (finding the distinction
a "logical morass"
and finding dubious the assertion that the line between substantive and procedural rules is sufficiently
clear to provide any workable distinction). Thus, the difficulties in assigning particular rules to the
category of substance or the category of procedure is illustrated by a statute of limitations which prescribes that an action for negligence must be commenced within two years after the event. This prescription might be viewed as a rule of substance, for it expresses a firm condition on the plaintiff's right
to recover. On the other hand, it might be viewed as a rule of procedure, for it regulates a step in a
lawsuit, the first step, the time within which suit must be initiated. See generally Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (characterizing the statute of limitations and full faith and credit clause).
47 See Sun Oil, 486 U.S. at 726-28 (holding that the distinction between substance
and procedure
depends on context). For example, the distinction may be drawn to resolve the conflicts-of-law question of which state's law to apply, see, e.g, EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS § 3.8 (3d ed.
2000); or to determine whether a change in the law violates the ex post facto prohibition, see, e.g.,
Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433 (1987); or to decide whether an enactment exceeds a rulemaker's
enabling authority, see, e.g., Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941); or to settle, under Erie,
whether federal or state law applies in a diversity action, see, e.g., Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U.S. 208 (1939).
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ior within the courtroom.48 Under that schema a rule governing the appeal
process would be deemed procedural.
The court's effort to distinguish between substantive and procedural
rules may rest on an assumption that substantive rules give rise to reliance
claims in a way that procedural rules do not."' While that conclusion may
be valid in certain circumstances, ° the distinction is not always a useful
measure of reliance interests. Both kinds of rules can be outcomedeterminative, and thus one is not inherently more important to a litigant

than the other."' Procedural rules affect the quality and degree of access to
the legal system and therefore determine the protection provided by substantive rules and remedies. 2
C. The Relevant Values

In any case, the categorical substance-procedure division should be
seen not as an end in itself but as a shorthand way of getting at the considerations that matter, including the nature of the change, the legal context
into which it is introduced, and the extent of destabilizing influence on the
legal structure that its application will produce. One of the relevant values
is the protection of justifiable reliance. 3 Courts, after all, have reason not
to upset settled expectations. The idea of reliability of the law requires that
law be sufficiently stable so that people may plan their affairs for the future
with the expectation of being able to carry them out.' Accordingly, two
questions about party behavior need to be addressed. First, was there likely
48 GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN,

UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2d ed.

1994). In other words, procedural rules constitute the mechanics of litigation, prescribing the method
by which people may bring controversies before the courts and by which they must unfold and conduct
those controversies once in the courts.
49 See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 71 (1949) (holding that there are diminished reliance
interests in matters of procedure).
50 See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (explaining that there is no justified reliance interest in state).
51See Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 268-70 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (holding
that the answer to the question of temporal application of the statute does not lie in the ill-defined
substance versus procedure distinction; holding a person liable for attorney's fees affects "substantive"
right no less than holding him liable for compensatory or punitive damages, and legislative purpose and
identification of the relevant activity the rule regulates are key).
52 Fisch, supra note 36, at 1087.
3Thus, it is less likely procedural rules are ones that people will rely on in planning
and conducting their primary, everyday activity.
54 This reliability idea not only represents a central social value but also constitutes an important
social instrument. Any society which looks to make use of individual initiative must assure people that
the law by which they act will remain substantially the same as at the time of action. However, as
demonstrated infra, in this case no such action in reliance on the pre-1986 law--reliance warranting
protection against disappointment--occurred. The situation is not one, for example, in which application of the 1986 rule would operate to impose liability on someone who has relied, in his primary
behavior, on the preexisting law.
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reliance on the prior law, or what reasonably appeared to be the prior law?
Second, was the reliance of the character that should be credited; i.e., was
the behavior of the sort that should induce sympathy from the legal system
and therefore be viewed as legally significant?
What reliance might have occurred in our hypothetical, or similar
cases? First, as an empirical matter, it is difficult to imagine the occurrence of party behavior representing substantial reliance on the prior appellate rule.55 Second, even if reliance occurred, it is not the sort of reliance
which should be treated as giving rise to a claim of unfair surprise, and that
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the party that might have relied
here is the state. 6 Conceivably a prosecutor may have prepared his case
seeking an order of transfer differently in the knowledge that the judge's
ruling could not be appealed immediately, for example by devoting less
time to it. But such behavior appears unlikely since the order is subject to
appeal at the end of the case and therefore he remains interested in providing a strong foundation for a ruling in his favor. Moreover, he knows that
an adverse ruling by the superior court is similarly not immediately appealable, and therefore it is in his interest to make a concerted effort to obtain a
positive ruling. In any case, if a prosecutor did rely on the prior law by
preparing less vigorously, that is not the sort of reliance that is worthy of
protection and that should give a court pause in deciding to implement a
change.5 7 A persuasive claim of unfair surprise can not be made to protect
a decision to offer a lesser prosecutorial effort.
A claim of unfair surprise is also dubious in this setting because a
prosecutor could not confidently assume that the court would not apply the
1986 rule. The issue would hardly be a settled one, and an attentive lawyer
would know that it was fairly open to difference of opinion." In sum, ap55 The notion of reliance by the defendant (or the State) at the level of primary activity, i.e., behavior before the prosecutorial process was initiated, is fantastic in this context. The effect of a change
in appellate rule hardly compares to situations involving the alteration of the value of prior investments,
the upset of settled transactions, or the increase of a party's liability for past conduct, circumstances
raising a plausible claim of inequity and a need for transition relief. See generally Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. Smith, 486 U.S. 167 (1990) (discussing future plans made in reliance on revenues collected).
56 See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 645 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) ("I simply cannot believe that the State of Louisiana has any 'vested interest' that we should recognize in these circumstances in order to keep Linkletter in jail.").
57 See Robinson v. Davis Mem'l Goodwill Indus., 790 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1992)
(finding it difficult to believe and, if true, impossible to endorse that employer engaged in discriminatory behavior in
reliance on prior standards); see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF
STA'rUTES 152-53 (1982) (arguing that reliance is an inapt excuse for substandard behavior).
58 See Fisch, supra note 36, at 1086, 1108-10 (stating that justified reliance depends on clarity
and predictability of the law prior to the adoption of a new rule, the relative extent to which expectations about the rule affected primary conduct, and the degree to which these expectations were reasonable; reliance may be unreasonable if a rule is unsettled, the context is in flux, or the equilibrium is
unstable); see also CALABRESI, supra note 57, at 151-52 (illustrating situations where reliance on rule
is unjustified); see generally Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (holding that a

2004]

RETROACTIVITYAND THE SKAKEL CASE

plication of the 1986 rule would not generate a legitimate fairness concern,
and there is no hardship to be redressed here."'
A second value at stake in this kind of case is identification of the purpose of the legislative change and consideration of whether that purpose
would be served by application of the change in the instant case. Here the
objectives are clear, and there is no doubt that they would be best effectuated by application of the change. The legislative purpose is to protect
juveniles from adverse consequences of an erroneous transfer order that
can never be remedied later. If tried in the juvenile court, the defendant is
entitled to a confidential proceeding ° and is protected against being mixed
with adult prisoners. If transferred, the trial can be public, and he can be
jailed with adults. If it is claimed that a transfer order is in error, these
important rights to privacy and segregation can be protected only if an appeal of the transfer order can be pursued before the case is actually tried.
The 1986 change bespeaks a recognition that the injury to a juvenile that
may result from his confinement in an adult detention facility as well as the
exposure likely to follow from a transfer order are irreversible consequences of the ruling that cannot adequately be rectified at a later time,
even if he prevails at trial in a regular criminal proceeding or on appeal
from a judgment in such a proceeding.6 Clearly, the legislative purpose
decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish new principle of law by deciding an issue
"whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed"); PAUL J. MISHKIN & CLARENCE MORRIS, ON LAW
INCOURTS 242-43 (1965).
59 In the court's approach, a central question is whether the 1986 amendment is seen as clarifying
or changing the law. If an enactment is viewed as clarifying, the court is likely to apply it "retroactively." See In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 628-29, 784 A.2d 317, 321-22 (2001). But why should
whether an enactment is deemed clarifying or changing, rather than considerations of justifiable reliance and legislative purpose, determine the issue of retroactivity? Perhaps an operating assumption is
that a clarifying enactment will likely occur shortly after the "erroneous" judicial decision, and therefore there will not be much time for reliance on the incorrect opinion. However, how quickly new
legislation will be passed and therefore the extent of the opportunity for reliance will vary from case to
case. Imagine the following scenario. The Connecticut Supreme Court interprets a statute. People rely
on that interpretation. Within a relatively short period of time, the legislature passes a law "clarifying"
the act that had been interpreted. What should matter, among other factors, in deciding whether the
new legislation is to be applied to cases whose operative facts predate its passage is the character of that
reliance, not whether the recent law is clarifying or changing. The critical question is whether the
court's approach, the dichotomy it employs in its reasoning, gets at the values that matter. It is doubtful. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
60 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-122, 124, 146 (2003).
61 In re Bromell G., 214 Conn. 454,460-61,572 A.2d 352,355 (1990); see Mar. 7, 1986 Hearing
Before the Joint Standing Committee on the Judiciary, 1986 Sess. 826-27, 845 (Conn. 1986). In other
words, if a transfer order is ultimately found erroneous on appeal after sentence has been imposed, a
case can be remanded for further proceedings in the juvenile division. However, the element of privacy
conferred by a juvenile proceeding could not be restored by a subsequent private trial or by subsequent
segregated detention. Imprisonment of a juvenile in an adult correctional facility while awaiting trial or
pending appeal of a conviction as a nonjuvenile offender may produce irreparable harm.
Even without a statutory right to segregation, though, a transferred juvenile offender need not
necessarily be held while awaiting trial in a nonjuvenile facility, such as an adult prison. The Commis-
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would be promoted by application of the 1986 change. Indeed, advancement of the identified interests depends not a whit on whether the operative
facts of the alleged crime occurred before or after 1986.62
Moreover, application of the 1986 rule in our hypothetical case would
not have a destabilizing effect on the legal structure. It would impose no
significant administrative (or educational) costs. No unacceptable dislocation would take place, as this rule has been used on a regular basis for fifteen years.63
A related body of law, that of evidence, points to the desirability, in
deciding whether a new rule is to be applied to the case at hand, of attending to the character of the rule and the purpose of the change rather than to
references to "retroactivity" or "substance versus procedure." Imagine a
change in the law of hearsay so that evidence previously inadmissible is
now admissible. For example, prior inconsistent statements of a non-party
witness, which previously were admissible only for impeachment purposes,
may now be used substantively as probative of the facts contained in the
statements." Should this rule be applied in a trial of a dispute the operative
facts of which occurred prior to the change in the evidentiary rule? As we
have seen, in one sense, such application would be "retroactive," and in
another sense it would not. But what should fuel the analysis are considerations of legislative purpose and reliance. And since here, presumably,
the legislature, or court, opted for the change in order to admit reliable and
relevant evidence in order to improve the accuracy of the adjudicative
process, and since it is difficult to see any reliance on the prior rule at the
stage of primary behavior, the new rule should apply. Conversely, imagine
the legislature has narrowed a privilege, such as the doctor-patient privilege, which previously existed. Again, the legislative decision is based, in
part, on a determination that the fact-finding process would be aided by the
change, but here there may well have been serious behavioral reliance on
sioner of Correction has discretion to place the offender in a facility suitable for his health and welfare.
In re Juvenile Appeal (85-AB), 195 Conn. 303,310 n.5, 488 A.2d 778, 782 n.5 (1985).
62 More generally, prescriptions about the availability of interlocutory appeals constitute a legislative determination about the efficiency and/or fairness of the adjudicative process. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 643-45 (5th ed. 1998). And effectuation of that deter-

mination does not depend on whether the operative facts of a case occurred prior to the date of the
legislative enactment.
63 Cf Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 181-86 (1990) (noting disruptive consequences, and significant administrative costs, for State and its citizens, so retroactive application of
earlier decision invalidating highway use taxes would unfairly burden State's current operations and
future4plans made in reliance on tax revenues collected).
See State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 749-59, 513 A.2d 86, 90-92 (1986) (holding a prior inconsistent statement, where written and signed, admissible to prove truth of matters asserted therein;
although previously only admissible to impeach a witness); COLIN C. TAIT, HANDBOOK OF CONNECTICUT EVIDENCE 681-85 (3d ed. 2001).
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the prior rule. So the better result would be that the new rule not apply.65
In Edelstein v. Department of Public Health & Addiction Services,66
the court recognized a doctor-patient privilege.67 It applied the privilege to
the case at hand and to subsequent proceedings, including proceedings
whose operative facts predated the Edelstein decision." One might argue
that such application runs counter to the view of reliance presented in this
essay and erroneously deprives the court of relevant evidence. However,
the result may be defensible if one views the court's decision not as a judicial dictate but rather as a recognition of a pre-existing relationship of trust
and confidence that has socially evolved. From that perspective the court's
ruling is as much about recognizing and validating an existing social fact as
"creating" a legal relationship and rule. But in either case the relevant considerations are the legislative purpose (or judicial rationale if the change
was made by a court), the character of the rule, and the possibility of unfair
surprise. References to "retroactivity" or "substance versus procedure"
are, at best, a way to move our thinking to those central considerations.
Reference to legislative objective underscores another important consideration. The 1986 change presumably reflects a legislative determination that the new rule is an improvement. This view that the new rule improves the operation of the system supports the application of that rule to
as broad a class of cases as possible. A court would frustrate the purposes
of the legislation by refusing to apply it to precisely the kind of situation
demonstrating the need for the amendment. 69 And note that the approach
to the resolution of our hypothetical that looks to legislative purpose, justifiable reliance, and administrative impact treats these concerns as analytically key without regard to whether or not the new statute is deemed a
"clarifying" enactment.7 °
D. Age of the Defendant
But what of the age of our hypothetical defendant? In seeking to buttress its conclusion in the Skakel opinion, the Connecticut Supreme Court
argues:
65 When the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated, Congress provided a safety valve to

take care of some of these kinds of situations. The Rules were to apply to proceedings pending at the
time of their effective date "except to the extent that application of the rules ... would work injustice,
in which event former evidentiary rules apply." Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
66240 Conn. 658, 692 A.2d 803 (1997)
67 Id. at 805-07.
68 See id. (finding that although privilege was legislatively created in 1990, it applies to communications made prior to 1990).
69 Cf. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjomo, 494 U.S. 827, 859 (1990) (White J., dissenting); supra note 61.
70 See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
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[T]he only effect of retroactive application of the
amendment would be to allow persons who, like the respondent, are charged with committing murder as juveniles before
1986 to appeal directly from transfer orders. None of those
persons is now a juvenile. Retroactive application of the
amendment, therefore, would entail all of the 'delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeals'.., without advancing the underlying purpose of the amendment [to protect
juveniles' privacy and insure their segregation during pretrial
and trial proceedings].7
But this reasoning is problematic on a number of accounts. First of all,
it is not uncommon for a person who is appealing a transfer ruling to no
longer be a juvenile at the time his appeal is heard or decided.72 Thus,
though Skakel is obviously an extreme case, the transfer-order appellant
who is no longer a juvenile is not at all an unusual case under the framework established by the 1986 amendment. Second, what would be the dividing line? The juvenile offender who is arrested when he is twenty years
old? Twenty-five years old? Thirty years old?73 The court can offer no
71 In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 630, 784 A.2d 317,
323 (2001).

72 See State v. Torres, 206 Conn. 346, 349, 538 A.2d 185, 186 (1988) (adjudicating a case where

defendant, fifteen at time of alleged offense, was nineteen or twenty years old at time of appellate
decision); cf State v. Kelley, 206 Conn. 323, 323-26, 537 A.2d 483, 484-85 (1988) (deciding a case
where defendant was fourteen at time of crime and eighteen or nineteen at time of appellate decision).
To support its argument, the court notes that the "problem" presented by aging juveniles was recognized by the legislature when it enacted the 1994 law deleting the final judgment language from section
46b-127. Michael S., 784 A.2d at 323 n.1 I. Thus, Senator Jepsen observed that by the time an appeal
from a transfer order is taken, "the juvenile is no longer a juvenile." Id. And Representative Graziani
noted that the child is typically over sixteen by the time the appeal is decided. Id. Yet the deletion of
the final judgment language and the prohibition of an immediate appeal hardly solve this "problem."
Imagine the scenario where a juvenile is arrested, a transfer hearing held, and the case transferred to the
regular criminal docket. An immediate appeal of the transfer is precluded. After the trial in superior
court is concluded and a final judgment entered, the defendant now appeals the propriety of his transfer
from juvenile to adult court, as this point in time represents his first opportunity to contest that decision
on appeal. By the time the appeal is resolved, the defendant is no longer a juvenile. Cf State v.
Belcher, 51 Conn. App. 117, 119, 721 A.2d 899, 900 (1998) (deciding a case where defendant was
fourteen years old at time of crime and nineteen years old at time of appellate decision). Of course,
under the regime established by the 1994 law, the transfer issue may become moot; for example, the
defendant may be acquitted in the superior court proceeding, and therefore there will be no appeal.
However, if there is an appeal of the validity of the transfer and it is successful, it is even more likely
than under the 1986 law that the person who ultimately stands trial in juvenile court will no longer be a
juvenile.
73See generally Brief of the Respondent-Appellant at 20, In re Michael S., 258
Conn. 621, 784
A.2d 317 (2001) (No. SC 16556); Reply Brief of the Respondent-Appellant at 1-2, In re Michael S.,
258 Conn. 621,784 A.2d 317 (2001) (No. SC 16556) (stating court's posture when applied to interpretation of transfer statute produces automatic transfer rule for anyone charged with juvenile offense after
attaining age of majority; if increase in age affects likelihood of transfer, or availability of procedural
benefit, State might opportunistically delay in filing charges until individual is eighteen to increase
chance of transfer).
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principled distinction between these cases. This line of reasoning is defective and does not support rejection of application of the 1986 change.74
Moreover, application of the 1986 change, and the reasoning offered
here for that result, do not violate any policy of clear statement. 75 For example, the direction in favor of strict construction of penal statutes does not
caution against such a decision.76 Indeed, the result is one that is solicitous
to the defendant.
What is the purpose of this strict construction doctrine? One objective
is to insure that people have been given fair warning of the law's commands before they are stigmatized as criminals. This concern for fair
warning refers to the formulation and interpretation of rules and directs that
their scope and content be clear and specific. 7 But the foundation of this
principle of lenity goes beyond a concern for fair notice. It reflects a recognition of the separation of legislative and judicial functions, and a sensitivity to the liberty of potential defendants. The maxim, then, represents an
institutional means of reinforcing the appropriate role of courts in the enforcement of criminal statutes as detached, dispassionate, perhaps even
74 In fact, the interest in confidence might still be served in some measure in the case of
an older

defendant, if that person is not a member of a family with the notoriety of the Skakels. Similarly, the
value of differential treatment of antisocial behavior by juveniles, i.e., that a juvenile be held accountable for his actions but be permitted to move on with (hopefully) a better life and that move be facilitated by the private character of the juvenile proceedings, may still be furthered with an older defendant.
75As a matter of institutional design, in various situations it is socially desirable to insist
that a
legislature speak with special clarity if it wishes to direct a departure from established general principles and policies of law. In effect, these presumptions say to the legislature, "If you mean this, you
must say so plainly." HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1209 (1994). In these situations, wise policy argues

against giving words an unusual meaning even though that meaning may be linguistically permissible.
One familiar and longstanding policy of clear statement requires that words which mark the boundary
between criminal and noncriminal conduct should speak with more than ordinary clearness. Id. at
1376-77.
76 The doctrine that penal statutes should be strictly construed has generally been accepted
as a
corollary of the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. Id. at 492. ("Strictly" in this context means
narrowly or least expansively, not "severely".) In its unquestioned application, this doctrine forbids the
extension of a criminal statute by analogy to cover conduct which cannot by any stretch of"interpretation" be brought within its terms. Id. But it also expresses a policy in favor of a narrower rather than a
broader interpretation of a criminal prohibition even when the broader interpretation is permitted by the
language. Id. This counsel against giving words an unusual meaning even though that meaning may
be linguistically permissible is an expression of the broader requirement that words which mark the
boundary between criminal and noncriminal conduct should speak with more than ordinary clarity. Id.
at 1376-77.
77 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(I)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (stating that the "general purposes of the provisions governing the definition of offenses are ... to give fair warning of the nature of
the conduct declared to constitute an offense"); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 60, 206-07 (1999) (discussing textual meaning when the implications of the directly
applicable text are not clear).

CONNECTICUTLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:511

commands.7"

slightly reluctant, enforcers of the legislature's
Acceptance of the conclusion that application of the 1986 statute is the
correct choice in our hypothetical would not necessarily be inconsistent
with the statute of limitations decision in State v. Skakel,79 where the superior court applied the statute of limitations in existence at the time of the
offense rather than the statute of limitations in place at the time of trial, nor
would it be in conflict with the decision in In re Daniel H.,s where the
court concluded that the post-1994 rule about lack of immediate appeal, in
place at the time of the hearing and transfer order, was not to be applied to
juvenile defendants whose alleged offense occurred prior to 1994, but
rather the appeal rule in existence at the time of the offense was to be applied.
In a statute of limitations case important values of repose come into
play, values not at stake in In re Michael S.8' In fact, Skakel declined to
argue for the application of the contemporary statute of limitations not only
because of judicial precedent but because that statute disfavored his interest, as it clearly provides no time limit on the prosecution of the kind of
offense with which he was charged. 2 Instead, the focus of the dispute was
on the correct interpretation of the statute of limitations in place in 1975,
the defendant arguing it imposed a five-year limit, the prosecutor disagreeing, and the judge agreeing with the prosecutor.8 3 Similarly, in In re
Daniel H., though one might well in the end disagree with the decision,8 '
78See MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 58, at 380-83 (explaining that "Policies... against judgemade crimes also imply that doubt as to whether the legislature intended certain conduct to be prohibited should be resolved in favor of non-criminality"); see also United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 76,95 (1820) (Marshall, J.):
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old
than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is
to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3548, at *2 (Dec. 11, 2001).
80 237 Conn. 364, 378, 678 A.2d 462,468-69 (1996).
8 See generally State v. Crowell, 228 Conn. 393, 462 A.2d 678 (1994) (holding that statutes of

limitation are to be construed liberally in favor of the accused).
82 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-193(a) (2003):
[N]o person may be prosecuted for any offense, except a class A felony, involving
sexual abuse, sexual exploitation or sexual assault of a minor except within thirty
years from the date the victim attains the age of majority or within five years from
the date the victim notifies any police officer ... provided if the prosecution is for a
violation of subdivision (I) of subsection (a) of section 53a-71, the victim notified
such police officer or state's attorney not later than five years after the commission
of the offense.
83 Skakel, 2001 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3548, at *4, *15. The judge's decision is currently being
contested on appeal. See Brief for Appellant at 34-50, State v. Skakel (Conn. filed Nov. 24, 2003) (No.
S.C. 16844) (arguing that this prosecution for non-capital murder is barred by five-year statute of
limitations in effect in 1975).
g4 See discussion infra Part Ill, (discussing whether In re Daniel S. was correctly decided).
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the principle of lenity expressed in the directive that penal statutes be
strictly construed arguably is relevant." The result is an outcome solicitous to the defendant. That policy plays no role in In re Michael S., a decision which is not solicitous to the defendant.

II.

IN RE MICHAEL S., RETROACTIVITY, CLARIFYING ENACTMENTS,
AND OVERRULING

At first glance it might appear that the Michael S. case itself presented
our hypothetical, as the court's opinion focused on the 1986 amendment
and the 1975 appellate rule, as judicially construed. In fact, the question
decided, and briefed, was more limited. 6
The choice throughout a case like Skakel-indeed, the challenge such a
case presents to the legal system--is between the law in effect at the time
of the alleged offense and the law in effect at present." Similarly, our hypothetical forced a choice between the appellate rules in existence in 1975
and those deemed to be in operation today. However, in a prior case, In re
Daniel H., the Connecticut Supreme Court had held that the present law,
the product of the 1994 enactment by which the legislature eliminated the
right to an immediate appeal from a court order transferring a juvenile mat85 Lawrence M. Solan, Should Criminal Statutes Be Interpreted Dynamically?, 2002 ISSUES IN
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 8, 4,at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
viewpoint.cgi?article=1027&context=ils (last visited Jan. 16, 2004) (on file with the Connecticut Law
Review) (explaining how, to Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
76, 95 (1820), "lenity was necessary both to protect against judicial incursion into the legislature's
domain and to ensure that defendants receive fair notice that their conduct may be subject to prosecution and criminal sanctions"). While judicial application of the principle of lenity is erratic, the interpretation of criminal laws, nevertheless, is constrained. Id. 5.
86 The limited character of the question is reflected in the space given it in the parties' briefs. The
Respondent-Appellant devotes only four and a half pages to the argument that it has a statutory right to
appeal the transfer order of the juvenile court. Brief of the Respondent-Appellant at 10-14, In re Michael S.,258 Conn. 621, 784 A. 2d 317 (2001) (No. SC 16556). The State's brief gives the issue fourteen pages. See Brief of the State of Connecticut-Appellee at 4-18, In re Michael S.,258 Conn. 621,
784 A. 2d 317 (2001) (No. SC 16556).
87 In the case of appellate rules the law in 1975 and the law today are the same-an immediate
appeal from a transfer order cannot be taken. As previously noted, the statute in place in 1975 with
respect to juvenile appeals has been amended several times. In 1975 a person aggrieved by a final
order of the juvenile court had a ight to appeal. Following a supreme court decision interpreting the
statute, that an order of the juvenile court transferring a proceeding to the adult superior court was not a
"final judgment" for purposes of appeal and was not an appealable interlocutory ruling, the legislature
in 1986 amended the juvenile transfer statute, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127, to state that an order
"transferring a child from the docket for juvenile matters to the regular criminal docket of the superior
court shall be a final judgment for purposes of appeal." 1986 Conn. Pub. Acts 86-185, § 2 (codified at
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127 (1987)) (repealed 1994). In 1994 the legislature again amended the
juvenile transfer statute and removed the provision that a transfer order is a final judgment for purposes
of appeal. 1994 Conn. Pub. Acts 94-2 § 6 (Spec. Sess.) (codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127
(2003)).
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ter to the regular criminal docket, does not apply to juveniles who were
charged with offenses that occurred prior to October 1, 1994, the effective
date of the amendment. 88 This decision that the present rules about interlocutory appeal are to apply only "prospectively" amounts to a choice that
the law with respect to appellate rules at the time of the alleged offense will
govern rather than the present law.
Accordingly, the question before the court in Michael S., as it defined
it, was not that presented by our hypothetical-a choice between the 1975
law and the present law. Rather, having implicitly chosen the 1975 law as
applicable via In re Daniel H., the issue was whether, and to what extent,
the 1986 enactment provided illumination or instruction as to the content of
the 1975 law to be applied. 9 Initially, the notion of looking to legal directives enacted in 1986 to define the law in existence in 1975 appears, at
least, peculiar. In fact, a focus on a subsequent enactment and an inquiry
as to its retroactivity is misguided. That approach not only runs counter to
one of the presumable justifications for choosing 1975 law as applicablereal (or imputed) reliance by the defendant-but also is at odds with a
prime objective of the legal system-uniformity of decision with respect to
those who have behaved similarly at the same point in time. A few examples should make these critical points clear.
Imagine two people who have been involved in automobile accidents
in 1975. In that year contributory negligence is the accepted doctrine in the
state's tort law. In 1977 a legislative enactment 9° substitutes a pure comparative negligence rule9 for that of contributory negligence and explicitly
states that the change is retroactive, i.e., it applies to cases the operative
facts of which arose prior to the date of the enactment. 92 In 1979, the legis88

In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 372, 376,678 A.2d 462,466-67 (1996).

89 Michael S., 784 A.2d at 319-20.
90 The point being made here is independent of the source of the legal change.
That is, it would

have force as well if the change in the contributory negligence rule were made by the judiciary rather
than the legislature.
91 Pure comparative negligence refers to an approach that looks to the relative fault of the parties
and adjusts the recovery accordingly. See MARC A. FRANKLIN & ROBERT L. RABIN, TORT LAW &
ALTERNATIVES 440 (7th ed. 2001). If both parties are negligent, the plaintiff's damages are reduced,
but unlike contributory negligence, not to zero. So if the plaintiff is five percent at fault, his judgment
will be decreased by five percent. Similarly, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault, he can still recover ten percent of his damages. Id.
92 Typically the extent of retroactive effect, and the possibility of unfair surprise, will be limited
by the operation of a number of legal doctrines, most notably the statute of limitations and the rules of
res judicata and collateral estoppel, which protect interests in reliance, finality and repose. These longestablished principles of adjudication restrict the degree to which nominally retroactive rules affect
prior events.
A legislature concerned about retroactive impact and intent on moderating that effect may resort
to devices such as grandfathering, phase-in periods, post-enactment effective dates, and compensation.
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lature enacts a qualified version of comparative negligence9 3 instead and
again states that the change is retroactive. The first person's case comes to
trial in 1977, the second person's in 1979. It would be ill-advised for a
court that has decided that the law at the time of the accident (1975) is controlling to highlight the retroactive character of the enactments and to apply
the pure comparative negligence rule to the first person and the qualified
version to the second person. Such an injudicious approach would run
counter to the aspiration of formal justice to uniform treatment of similar
cases.
The same critique applies if we consider rules of appeal rather than
changes in tort law. To determine the content of the rules about final
judgments and interlocutory appeal in 1975, it is improper to consider a
subsequent enactment, for example a 1986 statute, and ask whether it is
retroactive. Let us be clear. The contention here is not that faced with a
choice between application of 1975 or later law--our earlier hypothetical-the court should opt for 1975 law. Rather, the point is that having
opted for 1975 law (and having characterized rules about appeal as substantive), the court should not look to enactments subsequent to 1975 and
ask whether they are retroactive in order to determine the content of the
law it will apply. Such judicial behavior is inconsistent with a prime rationale for the choice of 1975 law as governing and raises the possibility of
inconsistent treatment of similarly situated litigants.
A. Clarifying Statutes
The notion of a clarifying statute provides another possible rationale
for the practice of a court looking to enactments subsequent to the critical
time of behavior in order to determine the law to apply to that behavior. A
clarifying statute is one whose purpose is to make plain the meaning of a
previous act, for example to clear up ambiguities in a prior statute. It
stands in contrast to an enactment designed to change existing law. If a
statute is viewed as clarifying, the Connecticut Supreme Court will typically apply it retroactively.94
93 Partial comparative negligence systems deny any recovery to a plaintiff whose own negligence

passes some threshold level, such as 50%. See FRANKLIN & RABIN, supra note 91, at 440.
94Edelstein v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Addiction Servs., 240 Conn. 658, 667-70,
692 A.2d 803,
807-09 (1997) (quoting State v. Magnano, 204 Conn. 259, 284, 528 A.2d 760, 772 (1987)) (stating that
"[w]here an amendment is intended to clarify the original intent of an earlier statute, it necessarily has a
retroactive effect"); see also Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 754-55 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that retroactive application of a statute is appropriate where congressional action constitutes a return to previous
law). Whether the 1986 statute should be characterized as "clarifying" or not was the focus of the
appellate argument in In re Michael S.
To some extent this dichotomy is an exercise in semantics. The clarifying statute also "changes
existing law" in that it alters, or corrects, the current judicial interpretation of the terms of the prior
statute. In addition, the effect of the enactment on the future is the same no matter what classification is
used to characterize the "change."
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Functionally, a court faced with a clarifying statute is in the same posture as a court confronted with the overruling of a precedent, whether an
interpretation of a statute or a common law ruling. The questions for the
court are whether to overrule, giving due weight to the values underlying
stare decisis, and, if so, whether to do so prospectively or retroactively.
The character of these questions is the same whether or not the conviction
of error issues from a clarifying statute. Similarly, the interests to be considered in determining whether to limit the change to prospectivity, in particular the reliance of a party, do not differ. And a presumption of retroactivity is no more or less justified if illumination comes from a clarifying
statute rather than a lawyer's brief.
In addition, why should whether an enactment is deemed clarifying or
changing, rather than considerations of justifiable reliance and legislative
purpose, determine the issue of retroactivity? Perhaps an operating assumption is that a clarifying enactment will likely occur shortly after the
*erroneous" judicial decision, and therefore there will not be much time for
reliance on the incorrect opinion (and that any reliance that occurs will not
be creditworthy).95 However, how quickly new legislation will be passed
and therefore the extent of the opportunity for reliance will vary from case
to case. Imagine the following scenario. The Connecticut Supreme Court
interprets a statute. People rely on that interpretation. Within a relatively
short period of time, the legislature passes a law "clarifying" the Act that
had been interpreted. What should matter, among other factors, in deciding
whether the new legislation is to be applied to cases whose operative facts
predate its passage is the character of that reliance, not whether the recent
law is clarifying or changing." And these points remain independent of
the chosen theory of lawmaking, i.e., whether one conceptually views the
court as engaged in declaring the true meaning of the act or as overruling a
prior precedent. The critical question is whether the court's approach, focusing on the dichotomy between changing and clarifying,9 7 gets at the
95 See infra note
96.
96

A clarifying enactment, though, may provide evidence that the prior ruling was unstable and

contested and therefore reliance on it was risky.
97The utility of the clarifying category also depends, of course,
on its administrability. That is,
the decision to employ the category in judicial reasoning rests, in part, on a judgment about whether a
court can determine its application consistently. Put more simply, how sure are we that a court can
correctly distinguish a clarifying from a changing enactment regularly? See generallyBrief for Appellee at 12-13, In re Michael S., 258 Conn. 621, 784 A.2d 317 (2001) (No. SC 16556) (arguing that
contrary inferences may be drawn from an amendment in the wake of a controversial judicial opinion).
Compare DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 911 F.2d 1377, 1388 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the Restoration Act was a new law and did not revive prior law), with Lussier v. Dugger, 904
F.2d 661, 666-67 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that the Restoration Act was restorative and signified a
return to previous law). The prospect of ill definition and inconsistent decisions points to costs not only
for litigants and public decisionmakers but also for private actors, such as lawyers faced with the task
of counseling clients.
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values that matter. It appears not.98
In short, characterization of a statute as "clarifying" or not provides little, if any, aid in analyzing the choice of law issue and answering the question of the statute's temporal reach.

III. IN RE DANIEL H. REDUX
Was In re Daniel H.,99 the case which framed the issue in In re Michael S., correctly decided? How should it have been decided? Using the
approach suggested in this essay, what were the relevant considerations?
The facts of the case and the issue presented were straightforward.
Daniel H. was charged with an offense that occurred prior to October 1,
1994.''0 More precisely, he was accused of murder in connection with a
shooting that took place on June 26, 1994."'1 The State moved to transfer
his case from the juvenile to the regular criminal docket.0 2 Following a
hearing, which was held after October 1, 1994, the court ordered the matter
to be transferred to the regular criminal docket.0 3 The defendant then appealed the trial court's transfer order. 4
The issue was whether an immediate appeal from the transfer order
was available. Prior to the amendment of the law in 1994, such an interlocutory appeal was permissible.'
However, in 1994 the legislature
amended the law to eliminate the right to an immediate appeal; the effective date of this amendment was October 1, 1994." ° Thus, this legislative
change occurred subsequent to the date of the defendant's alleged offense
but prior to the court's hearing and transfer order. Accordingly, the question for the court was whether to apply the contemporary law, the law in
existence at the time of the transfer hearing, or the law in effect at the time
the offense was committed. The contemporary law forbade an immediate
98

See supra note 54 and accompanying text. At best the approach directs attention indirectly to

the matter of reliance. See supra note 96. Functionally, whether it is sensible to ask whether an enactment is clarifying depends on why one is asking the question.
99 237 Conn. 364,678 A.2d 462 (1996).
oId. at 464.

101 Id. at 464 n.3.
102 Id. at 464.
103 Id. at 464-65.
104Id. at 465. The defendant initially appealed to the appellate court, which, applying the 1994
statute, dismissed the attempted appeal of the trial court's transfer order for lack of jurisdiction. Id.
The case then moved to the supreme court, which reversed the appellate court's dismissal, holding that
the 1994 amendment was inapplicable to the defendant. Id.
I5Id. at 466.
106 Id. at 463-64. Prohibition of an immediate appeal from a court's transfer order remains the
law today. See supra note 87.
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appeal. The prior law permitted one.
The considerations of legislative purpose and reliance point towards
application of the present law. The 1994 amendment presumably reflects a
legislative judgment that the new rule is an improvement, that it advances
the efficiency and/or fairness of the adjudicative process."' As noted previously, recognition that the new rule prohibiting interlocutory appeals
improves the operation of the process supports the application of the 1994
amendment to as broad a class of cases as possible." 9 Accordingly, to bar
an immediate appeal by Daniel H. serves the legislative objective. And
clearly, choice of the contemporary rule imposes no substantial administrative costs.
Analysis of the possibility of justifiable reliance in this setting also
provides justification for application of the contemporary appellate rule.
The notion that the defendant's primary behavior-the homicide-was
influenced by the appeal rule is incredible. Theoretically, such reliance is
conceivable. Imagine a situation where certain conduct is proscribed by
the criminal law with a set sanction for violation of the prohibition. The
defendant engages in the prohibited conduct. Subsequent to his conduct
the sanction is increased. From the perspective of deterrence this increase
in the severity of the penalty is of no significance. "0 Deterrence looks
forward rather than backwards; what matters is the "price" facing the potential violator as he contemplates pursuit of the criminal activity."' Accordingly, as a theoretical matter, the price facing Daniel H. included the
appellate rule in place along with the penalties for homicide. However, as
a practical matter, it would be unrealistic to believe that he placed any reliance on it in fashioning his behavior." 2
The reliance concern remains insubstantial when focus shifts to the de107

At stake, of course, is the timing of a permitted appeal of the transfer decision. The 1994

amendment does not eliminate the defendant's opportunity to appeal the issue, but provides that the
appeal must await the point in time when the defendant is sentenced.
108 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
109 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
110 A legislature may rationally choose to increase the sanction for other reasons, for example, to
satisfy victims, their families, or the more general populace. But one reason cannot be to deter conduct
that has (or has not) already occurred. See Fisch, supra note 36, at 1069 (discussing the retroactivity of
the liability rule in the distribution and wealth context).
III This same point grounds the proposition that retroactive application of extension of the copyright term of protection-provision of the lengthened period to works in existence-offers no incentive
effect. See ROBERT L. BARD & LEWIS KURLANTZICK, COPYRIGHT DURATION: DURATION, TERM
EXTENSION, THE EUROPEAN UNION, AND THE MAKING OF COPYRIGHT POLICY 181-82 (1999) (noting

that work for which term is extended has already been produced).
112 A reliance claim appears equally weak when we shift jurisprudential perspective from economics to Legal Process. See infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. Of course, one might also
argue that to the extent that the impropriety of his behavior is conceded, little weight should be accorded to a reliance claim, particularly a claim of reliance on other than a norm of primary conduct.
See MISHKIN & MORRIS, supra note 58, at 86 (discussing reliance on precedent).
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fendant's preparation for and trial of the transfer issue. As with the prosecutor in our original hypothetical," 3 it is difficult to conceive the existence
of lawyer behavior constituting substantial reliance on the rule permitting
immediate appeal. After all, the result to be sought, a result which makes
any reference to immediate appeal moot, is to secure an order which retains
the case in juvenile court. Again, if in some way the rule induced a decision by the lawyer to offer less effort, that is not the type of reliance that
should be treated as grounding a persuasive claim of unfair surprise. In
addition, the defendant's lawyer could not take for granted that the contemporary rule would not be applied. That issue was unsettled. In short,
application of the rule prohibiting appeal would not produce a legitimate
fairness concern, and there is no justifiable reliance to be protected here.
The reliance concern also appears weak when viewed from another
perspective. Henry Hart and Albert Sacks, whose work provides the foundation for the Legal Process School,"" draw a sharp distinction between
primary and remedial law." 5 Building on this distinction, they assess differently the consequences of change in these two bodies of law; in particular, the legitimacy of claims of unfair surprise is appraised differently if the
asserted reliance is on a primary norm as against a remedial provision. Put
starkly, surprise goes to conduct, not to remedy. If one's primary duty is
clear, concern about unfair surprise is misplaced in the face of a change in
the remedial law." 6 Put less strongly, for a court (or legislature) to add to
the consequences when a primary duty is breached is less troublesome than
to change a primary duty." 7 Even if one is skeptical about this sharp distinction,"' and therefore does not believe that a concern over surprise is
automatically resolved by the existence of a primary norm, such as a
criminal statute, the approach is helpful in evaluating claims of reliance.
113 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
114See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historicaland Critical
Introduction to

HART & SACKS, supranote 75, at li.
H5 Hart and Sacks define the terms as follows: Every general directive arrangement contemplates
something which it expects or hopes to occur when the arrangement works successfully. This is the
primary purpose of the arrangement, and the provisions which describe what this purpose is are the
primary provisions. The provisions of an arrangement which indicate what happens in the event of
noncompliance or other deviation are called the remedial provisions. HART & SACKS, supra note 75, at
122-25 discussing primary law and remedial law).
I See id. at 60, 62, 458-66; Estrin, supra note 39, at 2073-75 (holding defendant has no entrenched right to preserve particular remedies); see generally Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S.
244, 296-97 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that remedial legislation, because it does not
alter the nature of existing rights and claims, is more commonly and appropriately retroactive).
117 For Hart and Sacks, unlike the law-and-economics analyst, a criminal prohibition is not just a
matter of calculation. Compare POSNER, supranote 62, at 242-43, with HART & SACKS, supra note 75,
at 60, 465-66.
It I am dubious. Hart and Sacks present the notion of primary duty as a unitary phenomenon. In
fact, it is not a unitary phenomenon to be deduced solely from a statute's words; custom and enforcement bear on it as well.
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And again, the upshot is that virtually no reliance interests, which would
preclude application of the contemporary appeal rule, are at stake in Daniel
H.'s situation.
Considerations of legislative purpose, reliance, and administrative feasibility, then, strongly support choice of the 1994 rule. What can be said
against this conclusion? In its opinion in the actual case, in which the court
opted for the application of the prior rule permitting an immediate appeal,
the court refers for support to the policy of strict construction of penal statutes." 9 Though the criminal character of the case is significant for judicial
decision-making, this maxim's insistence on linguistic clarity has no relevance in this setting. The caution is directed to a court engaged in the act
of interpretation, the attribution of meaning to a particular set of words. It
instructs as to what meaning should be viewed as linguistically permissible
and as to what meaning should be chosen between two linguistically permissible readings of the rule.120 The direction is that judicial resolution of
residual uncertainty in the meaning of penal statutes be biased in favor of
the accused. But a prescription of strict construction is inapt here because
the meaning of the 1994 amendment is crystal-clear. Indeed, no Connecticut court, in In re Daniel H. or any other case, has ever expressed doubt
about the meaning of the words of the 1994 enactment or about their import.'
The clarity of the enactment raises the speculation that the reference to strict construction is a makeweight for a result that appeared correct
to the court on other grounds.
The court's reference to strict construction, however, may implicate interests other than, or in addition to, linguistic. Beyond a concern about fair
warning of prohibited conduct, it appears to be expressing a policy of clear
statement, a presumption that says to the legislature, if you mean this, you
must say so plainly. More particularly, it indicates that retroactive application of the 1994 enactment must be supported by "clear and unequivocal
expression of legislative intent."'2 The concept and articulation of policies
of clear statement-judicial insistence that departures from established
legal principles be clearly announced--can be supported as elements of a
desirable approach to statutory interpretation and as expressive of a proper
2
view of the constitutional relationship between court and legislature. 1
The problem, though, is the undiscriminating judicial focus here on retroactivity. The issue in In re Daniel H. was whether to apply the appeal rule
established in 1986 or the contemporary rule instituted in 1994. As previ119
Inre Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 373, 678 A.2d 462,466 (1996).
120 See supra notes 75-76.
121 See supra notes 22, 87. The legislative history is clear about the purpose of the 1994 enactment. See 37 CONN. H.R. PROC. 9954-56 (1994); 37 CONN. S. PROC. 3630 (1994).
122 In re Daniel H., 678 A.2d at 467.
123 See HART & SACKS, supra note 75, at 1209-10, 1376-77.
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noted,'24

ously
it is doubtful that analysis of this central question will be
usefully aided by a discourse about retroactivity. That discourse may well
miss the relevant considerations. Put differently, if the court is to make
helpful use of the idea of a policy of clear statement, it must paint with a
finer brush. After all, there is no doubt that a legislative enactment which
changed the number of days from a defendant's request within which a
prosecutor has to produce a witness list or which altered the time within
which a speedy trial motion is to be decided would be applied "retroactively" to the adjudication of cases the operative facts of which preceded
the enactment, and there would be no insistence by a court that this enactment speak with more than ordinary clarity before it be so applied. The
point is that the need is to define what kinds of changes warrant a policy of
clear statement and why. The court has not produced that definition and
justification.'2 5
In addition to its reliance on a principle of lenity in various forms, the
court defends its conclusion about the choice of law by raising the concern
that application of the 1994 amendment would create the risk of opportunistic behavior resulting in differential treatment of similarly situated parties. The opinion reads:
Moreover, the state's theory of retroactivity in this context would be contrary to our presumption that in enacting
laws, the legislature does not intend to accomplish bizarre results. ... The state's proffered interpretation could lead to the
anomalous situation in which two individuals, having committed similar offenses on the same date, would be afforded
significantly different treatment based upon, at best administrative accident or, at worst, manipulation by the parties, regarding when the transfer order was entered. "Presumably,
the legislature did not intend to invite such manipulation of
the judicial docket ...,,126
But are the court's anxieties warranted? The fear of manipulative beSee supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
125The court's attitude might be viewed as expressive of a principle of lenity, rooted in concern
for personal liberty, that when in doubt in a criminal case a court should decide for the defendant.
While the concern for liberty is legitimate, that approach appears too expansive. If "doubt" is understood to refer to a situation where the defendant offers a plausible claim, for example that the pre-1994
appeal rule should be applied, the unacceptable implication of the directive would be that all such
claims are to be decided in favor of the defendant. On the other hand, if "doubt" refers to uncertainty
by the court in analyzing the choice of law issue, the question then becomes what level of uncertainty
triggers the prescription and how is that level of uncertainty to be defined.
126 In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 378, 678 A.2d 462, 469 n.I I (1996) (quoting State v. Bums,
236 Conn. 18, 26, 670 A.2d 851 (1996)).
124
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havior appears far-fetched.
Imagine a prosecutor who operates within a
framework which permits interlocutory appeals but who would prefer to
function in a universe in which immediate appeals are not permitted. It is
conceivable that he might delay filing his motion to transfer, but he would
do so in anticipation of legislative action. In other words, he would have to
predict statutory change and the content and timing of that change. Such
prognostications are uncertain, and opportunistic behavior based on these
prophecies is unlikely. Once the new rule is put in place, it would apply to
all subsequent transfer motions, and there would be no opportunity for manipulation. Moreover, the prosecutor's latitude in timing his motion to
transfer is significantly constrained, as he has a limited amount of time
after the juvenile arrest to argue for transfer.'28 Accordingly, the professed
concern about manipulative activity is unwarranted.
In the converse case, defendant's counsel would be similarly constrained by the need to predict legislative action and by the rules dictating
time limits in the processing of transfer requests. Indeed, his opportunity
for manipulative behavior would appear even more limited since, within
the parameters set by the rules, the prosecutor controls the timing of the
filing of the transfer motion.
A related serious question is whether a decision to apply the contemporary rule in this kind of situation raises the possibility not of opportunistic
behavior by the parties but of legislative abuse of power and therefore warrants a prophylactic response. Legislatures (and government officials) can
abuse their power by singling out particular individuals or groups (e.g.,
those accused of a certain kind of criminal behavior) for adverse treatment.
Concern about this kind of targeting of persons grounds the constitutional
restriction on bills of attainder,'2 9 punitive legislative acts directed against
individuals. 3 ° The prohibition of such bills is supported by a conviction

127

The possibility of different treatment of the same behavior occurring on the same day is inevi-

table whenever a change in the law occurs. Imagine two robberies (or breaches of contract) taking
place on January 1, 2003. The first robber is apprehended and tried in 2003. The second robber is
apprehended and tried in 2005. In 2004 a change in the hearsay rule (or in pleading requirements) is
enacted and applied in the trial of the second robber. The difference in practice is fortuitous, not the
result of prosecutorial nefariousness. However, since formal justice is a central value, to say that such
events are inevitable is not to say they are not sometimes worrisome. The basic questions, then, are
what kinds of differential treatment should be minimized and how should the system effect this minimization. See supra text accompanying note 38 (analyzing how any change alters the effects incident
to previous activity, and questioning what consequences count and why).
128 Indeed, under present law the case of a child charged with the commission of a capital felony,
a class A or class B felony-the kind of offense involved in Skakel's case-is automatically transferred
to the adult criminal docket provided the offense was committed after the child attained the age of

fourteen. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-127 (2003).
129 U.S. CONsT. art. I, §§ 9, 10.
130

The prohibition of ex post facto legislation and the takings clause may also be viewed as a re-

sponse to this concern. Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP.
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that punitive measures should be imposed by rules of general application. 3 ' Does the issue in In re Daniel H. implicate these kinds of concerns
about governmental regularity? The legislation involved in the case-and
similar kinds of legislation-evidence nary a hint of irregularity. At stake
is not an act of oppression by lawmakers who know exactly which individuals they are affecting. The prescription is in appropriately general
terms. And the legislative history makes clear that the enactment was not a
legislative lynching designed to burden certain individuals or groups unfairly, but, rather, was driven by concerns about the efficiency of the adjudicative process.'32 Thus, application of the contemporary rule in the case
would not violate important norms of governmental regularity.
Finally, in a footnote the court suggests that application of the 1994
amendment would raise significant concerns about the amendment's constitutionality in that it arguably makes the punishment for a crime more
burdensome after its commission and therefore might be found to be an ex
post facto law.'33 This suggestion is dubious. Obviously, there is no entitlement to be tried by the exact same corpus of law that existed at the time
of the offense, and the United States Supreme Court has upheld a number
of retroactive procedural changes lightening the prosecutorial burden
which were far more consequential than the appeal rule change put in place
by the 1994 legislation. 34
In addition, Collins v. Youngblood,'35 the case cited by the court in
support of its assertion, holds that the Ex Post Facto Clause condemns legislation which punishes as a crime an act previously committed that was
innocent when done; makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime,
after its commission; or deprives one charged with a crime of any defense
available at the time when the act was committed.'36 The citation to the
case, thus, is hardly persuasive, as the 1994 amendment falls into none of
these categories as defined by the Supreme Court. More fundamentally,
"retroactivity" was at stake in a significantly different sense in Collins than
LEGAL ISSUES 161, 196 (2003). This concern about governmental regularity serves interests other than
those of respecting reliance and affording fair warning.
131 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 51 n.10 (1964).
132 See 37 CONN. H.R. PROC. 9954-56 (1994); 37 CONN. S. PROC. 3630 (1994).
133 In re Daniel H., 237 Conn. 364, 376 n.10, 678 A.2d 462,468 n.10 (1996).
134 See, e.g., Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 170-71 (1925) (limiting right of jointly indicted defendants to receive separate trials); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 637-38 &
nn.8-9 (2d ed. 1988). See generally NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

521 (6th ed. 2001 ) (stating that the repeal of the right to appeal is not ex post facto).
As previously noted, supra note 107, the 1994 amendment does not eliminate the opportunity to

appeal the lower court's transfer decision, but rather shifts the timing of that appeal.
135 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990); see also Stogner v. California, 123 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2003)
(barring

prosecution after expired statute of limitations despite statute reviving cause of action).
136 U.S. CONST., art. 1,§ 10.
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in In re Daniel H. In Collins the defendant had been convicted, and his
conviction had been upheld on direct appeal. Accordingly, in ruling on
collateral review that retroactive application of the Texas statute permitting
judicial reformation of an improper verdict did not violate the Ex Post
Facto Clause, the Supreme Court was dealing with a case that had already
gone to final judgment. The potential dislocation from a contrary decision
in this kind of situation is far greater than in In re Daniel H. where the initial proceeding is ongoing and where, as we have seen, interests in reliance
and repose are virtually nil. Accordingly, the court's suggestion is unmeritorious.
In sum, In re Daniel H. was wrongly decided, and by implication the
contemporary rule prohibiting immediate appeal of a transfer order, the
product of the 1994 amendment, should have governed the adjudication of
Michael Skakel's case as well. None of this analysis gainsays the potential
dangers from "retroactive" application of a statute in a particular case. But
the task is to identify the damaging case, using apt criteria. And In re
DanielH. is not such a case.' 37
137

The failure to establish a proper framework and to focus on the relevant considerations ap-

pears elsewhere in the court's jurisprudence as well. A good example is the opinion in State v. Troupe,
237 Conn. 284, 677 A.2d 917 (1996), which addressed, and limited, the constancy of accusation doctrine.
In that case the court held that 1)a hearsay report of the victim's accusation can be used to bolster the victim's credibility but not to prove the facts reported; and 2) the report is to be confined to the
fact and timing of the accusation of rape and is not to include the details of the alleged attack. Id. at
928-29.
The court then announced that it would not order a new trial and that its modification of the rule
would only be applied "prospectively" that is, to "cases in which the constancy of accusation testimony
has not yet been admitted into evidence on the date of the publication of this opinion." Id. at 305.
Before analyzing the court's justification for this limitation, it is worth noting its use of the term "prospective", as the use underlines a previous point about the ambiguity and confusion of the terminology
of retroactivity. See supra text accompanying notes 26-38. The court here uses "prospective" to refer
to the situation in which a rule is employed in litigation which takes place after the rule has been announced. In this usage there is no reference to when the operative facts of the case occurred. Under
this meaning of "prospective", use of the 1994 appeal rule in Skakel or Daniel H.'s case (or the 1986
appeal rule in In re Michael S.) would be prospective. Indeed, there would be no question of retroactivity because the new rule of appeal would only apply to judicial proceedings which took place after its
enactment. (If the court is comfortable with the use of the new evidence rule in future litigation the
operative facts of which predated announcement of the modified rule, why is it not similarly comfortable with the use of the new appellate rule in litigation the operative facts of which predated the rule's
enactment? As we have just seen, both applications can be deemed "prospective".)
Having determined that a change in the constancy of accusation doctrine was called for, why did
the court limit its application and not order a new trial? The court argues that the decision was based
on policy considerations and not on constitutional grounds. Troupe, 677 A.2d at 929. But why should
that distinction be determinative? The Constitution, after all, only provides a set of minimum safeguards. Moreover, the court's decision presumably reflects a belief that the accuracy of the adjudicative process will be enhanced by the more restrictive rule; since the additional details are pure hearsay
and highly prejudicial, the fewer details the better. Not all sub-constitutional evidentiary (and procedural) rules are rooted in the pursuit of accuracy. For example, the rule that permits hearsay testimony
in the situation where the defendant has disabled the declarant is primarily grounded in the notion that
one should not benefit from one's wrongdoing. State v. Henry, 76 Conn. App. 515, 532-33, 820 A.2d
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IV. CONCLUSION

The case of Michael Skakel both points up the systemic complexities
produced by a prosecution years after the alleged offense and underlines
the recurrent issue of dealing with changes in the law. The Connecticut
Supreme Court's approach to the question of change is analytically deficient; and the result is a confusing and noncohesive treatment of the issue.
The categories it employs in responding to the choice of law issue are indistinct, lend themselves to arbitrary application, and do not force attention
to the important interests at stake. The court would do better if it addressed
those interests-justifiable reliance, legislative purpose, administrative
impact--directly in deciding whether to apply the contemporary rule or
that in existence at the time of the party's behavior. Utilization of that approach to determination of the temporal scope of a statute would have resulted in employment of the present rule on immediate appeal in the cases
of both Daniel H. and Michael S.

1076, 1081 (2003); Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6). However, the revision of the rule announced in Troupe is
aimed at improvement of the process in its search for truth. As such, it is hard to fathom why the
revised rule should not be applied to the defendant (and to cases on appeal). See generally State v.
Marshall, 246 Conn. 799, 807-10, 717 A.2d 1224, 1228-29 (1998).
The court offers an additional argument for its decision by reference to the reliance interests involved: "Moreover, to apply our new rule retrospectively would place unreasonable burdens on the
state and on victims whose constancy of accusation testimony was admitted in justified reliance on our
prior consistently applied law." Troupe, 677 A.2d at 929 n.21.
While attention to the question of reliance is analytically apt, the court's statements about reliance
appear confused or incorrect. It is hard to fathom why the State's burden would be any different, any
more unreasonable, than in any other case where a reversal occurs and a new trial is ordered. The
prosecution has the necessary evidence, as it previously did, and will introduce it with the limitation on
testimony about details of the alleged attack. No curtailment of investigation has occurred due to
reliance on the constancy of accusation doctrine. In short, the State has no justifiable reliance claim
which would appropriately forestall the order of a new trial. Its only "burden" is to now conduct a
prosecution with a restriction that the court has decided is necessary to further the integrity of the trial.
Reference to the victim's unreasonable burden is no more persuasive. The victim's testimony
would be no different on retrial. Under the constancy of accusation rule the victim must first testify
that she had made prompt and constant accusations to others, implicating the accused. Witnesses can
then bolster her testimony by testifying to the fact that the victim had, in fact, told them of the sexual
assault. The revision introduced by Troupe affects the testimony of these witnesses. It limits their
testimony to the fact that the victim had made an accusation; they may not also report the details of the
alleged attack. Troupe, however, affects not at all what is permissible or impermissible testimony by
the victim. Any reliance on the prior rule affected the testimony of the witnesses, not of the victim.
Again, the "burden" is to participate in a prosecution with a limitation that the court has determined is
required to enhance the integrity of the adjudicative process.
The court, then, appropriately considers the possible relevance of reliance interests, but offers a
defective analysis of the reliance issue and fails to provide a satisfactory justification for the temporal
limitation it imposes on its ruling.

